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Firms face uncertain financing conditions and are exposed to the risk of a sudden rise in financing
costs during financial crises. We develop a tractable model of dynamic corporate financial management
(cash accumulation, investment, equity issuance, risk management, and payout policies) for a financially
constrained firm facing time-varying external financing costs. Firms value financial slack and build
cash reserves to mitigate financial constraints. However, uncertainty about future financing opportunities
also induce firms to rationally time the equity market, even if they have no immediate needs for cash.
The stochastic financing conditions have rich implications for investment and risk management: (1)
investment can be decreasing in financial slack; (2) firms may invest less as expected future financing
costs fall; (3) investment-cash sensitivity, marginal value of cash, and firm's risk premium can all be
non-monotonic in cash holdings; (4) speculation (as opposed to hedging) can be value-maximizing
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The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 is a fresh reminder of the substantial uncertainties about ﬁnancing
conditions that corporations face at times, as well as the impact that market shutdowns can
have on the economy. Recent studies have documented dramatic changes in ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing
and investment behaviors during the crisis. For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009)
document aggressive credit line drawdowns by ﬁrms for precautionary reasons. Campello,
Graham, and Harvey (2009) and Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2010) show
that the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms planned deeper cuts in investment, spending, burned
more cash, drew more credit from banks, and also engaged in more asset sales in the crisis.
Intuitively it is quite sensible that ﬁrms should try to adapt to the ﬂuctuations in ﬁnanc-
ing conditions, including timing favorable market conditions and hedging against unfavorable
market conditions. However, there is little existing theoretical work that tries to answer the
following questions: How should ﬁrms change their ﬁnancing, investment, and risk manage-
ment policies during a period of severe ﬁnancial constraints? And how should ﬁrms behave
when facing the threat of ﬁnancial crisis in the future?
In this paper we address the above questions by proposing a dynamic model of invest-
ment, ﬁnancing, and risk management for ﬁrms facing stochastic ﬁnancing conditions. Our
model combines the corporate precautionary cash saving motive due to ﬁnancial constraints,
developed in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2010) (henceforth BCW), with the market timing
motives that endogenously arise due to stochastic ﬁnancing opportunities. The four main
building blocks of the model are: 1) a long-run constant-returns-to-scale production function
with independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) productivity shocks, convex invest-
ment adjustment costs, and a constant capital depreciation rate (as in Hayashi (1982));
2) stochastic external equity ﬁnancing costs; 3) constant cash carry costs; and 4) dynamic
hedging opportunities. We purposely hold the investment opportunities constant in order to
highlight the role of time-varying ﬁnancing conditions.
We analyze how a ﬁrm simultaneously adjusts its cash reserves, investment, hedging,
1ﬁnancing, and payout decisions in two settings. In one case, the ﬁrm is in the midst of a
ﬁnancial crisis trying to survive so as to preserve the ﬁrm’s going-concern value. In a second
case, we consider a ﬁrm currently facing relatively favorable ﬁnancing conditions, but is
anticipating a potential ﬁnancial crisis that will freeze up ﬁnancial markets.
The main results of our model are as follows. First, during a period of high external
ﬁnancing costs (e.g., a ﬁnancial crisis), the ﬁrm cuts investment and delays payout aggres-
sively in order to survive the crisis.1 While in general, the sooner the crisis is expected to end,
the less valuable cash can be to mitigate ﬁnancial constraints, we show that the opposite can
be true when cash holding is low. The intuition for this seemingly counter-intuitive result is
as follows. With low cash holding, the ﬁrm is facing an immediate liquidation threat. When
the crisis is expected to end soon, the “breathing room” provided by an extra dollar of cash
becomes especially valuable. This eﬀect can cause the marginal value of cash to rise as the
expected duration of the crisis gets shorter. It can also cause ﬁrms with low cash holdings to
underinvest more aggressively while its expected future ﬁnancing costs are falling, whereas
ﬁrms with relatively high cash holdings will invest more at the same time. Another interest-
ing ﬁnding in the crisis state is that the ﬁrm’s payout boundary is ﬁrst increasing and then
decreasing in the probability of exiting the crisis.
Second, we show that it may be optimal for ﬁrms to time equity markets. When there
is a signiﬁcant chance that ﬁnancing conditions will deteriorate dramatically, the ﬁrm will
optimally time the market by issuing new equity before it runs out of cash. Otherwise,
the window of opportunity for cheap equity funding may vanish. The timing results are
consistent with the ﬁndings in Baker and Wurgler (2002), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz
(2009), Fama and French (2005), and Huang and Ritter (2009).
Moreover, we show that market timing together with ﬁxed costs of external ﬁnancing
can give rise to convexity of ﬁrm value for low levels of cash holdings in states with good
ﬁnancing opportunities. The convexity result has several important implications. It implies
that investment can be decreasing in cash holding simply due to the market timing option.
1See the empirical evidence cited in the opening paragraph.
2This prediction is opposite to most models of investment with ﬁnancial constraints. It also
implies that the risk premium of a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm might not necessarily decrease
with its cash holding as often perceived. Finally, it implies that speculation instead of risk
management can sometimes be value-maximizing for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm.
Our third result is that the ﬁrm’s risk premium can be decomposed into two parts: a
technology risk premium and a ﬁnancing risk premium. Both components are sensitive to
changes in the ﬁrm’s cash holding, especially in the state of poor ﬁnancing conditions, where
the conditional risk premium ranges from 2% to 30% depending on the ﬁrm’s cash holding.
Moreover, while the technology risk premium generally decreases with cash holding, the
market timing eﬀect can make it increase with cash due to the convexity of ﬁrm value in
cash.
Fourth, as the expected duration of the state with favorable ﬁnancing conditions shortens,
the ﬁrm issues equity sooner in that state because the window of opportunity is smaller,
and the ﬁrm optimally delays cash payouts to shareholders more. Overall, the ﬁrm’s cash
inventory rises in anticipation of a signiﬁcant worsening of equity ﬁnancing opportunities.
These results conﬁrm the conjecture of Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), who ﬁnd that the
average cash-to-asset ratio of US ﬁrms has nearly doubled in the past quarter century, and
who attribute this rise in cash holdings to ﬁrms’ perceived increase in risk. These results
also help explain the investment and ﬁnancing policies of many US non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the
years prior to the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-2008, to the extent that these ﬁrms had anticipated
a potential worsening of ﬁnancing conditions.
Our results highlight the sophisticated dynamic interactions between ﬁrm savings and
investment. Typically, we expect that higher cash holdings or lower expected future ﬁnancing
costs will relax a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraint. Hence, investment should increase with cash
(and other ﬁnancial slack measures such as credit) and decrease with expected ﬁnancing
costs. This is generally true and holds in dynamic corporate ﬁnance models and also optimal
dynamic contracting models in the absence of stochastic ﬁnancing conditions.2 However, we
2See DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2010) for an example.
3show that with stochastic ﬁnancing opportunities, investment is no longer monotonically
increasing in cash, nor is it monotonically decreasing with expected ﬁnancing costs. The key
to these relations lies in the optionality of market timing and the dynamic behavior of the
marginal value of cash.
Our result also shows that ﬁrst-generation static models on ﬁnancial constraints and
corporate investment3 are inadequate to explain corporate investment policy based on simple
comparative statics analysis. In particular, static models are unsuited to explain the eﬀects
of market timing on corporate investment, since these eﬀects do not simply operate through a
change in the cost of external equity ﬁnancing or a change in the ﬁrm’s cash holdings. Rather,
market timing matters when there is a ﬁnitely-lived window of opportunity for cheap equity
ﬁnancing. Moreover, market timing interacts in a complex way with the ﬁrm’s precautionary
cash management: when cash is tight and dwindling it induces an acceleration in capital
expenditure, while when cash is abundant it induces a deceleration of investment in response
to a local reduction in cash holdings.
By construction, the productivity shocks in our model are i.i.d. Thus, ﬁrms that time
equity markets in our model are also ones with low cash holdings (as opposed to having
better investment opportunities). This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of DeAn-
gelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2009) that most ﬁrms who issue stock look as if they are cash
constrained. Therefore, one cannot reject the market timing hypothesis based on this ﬁnding
alone. Certainly, ﬁrms may issue equity in good times to ﬁnance investment opportunities,
but our model shows that ﬁrms issuing equity when cash holdings are low can be consistent
with a rational market timing explanation. Testing of our market timing hypothesis would
ideally look for ﬁrm behavior not only in equity issuance, but also in investment and hedging
decisions. For cash-strapped ﬁrms, corporate investment may increase, and speculation may
arise as the ﬁrm’s cash dwindles and gets closer to the issuance boundary to replenish its
cash holding.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the ﬁrst dynamic model of corporate
3See Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
4investment with stochastic ﬁnancing conditions. We echo the view expressed in Baker (2010)
that supply eﬀects may be signiﬁcant for corporate ﬁnance. While we treat changes in
ﬁnancing conditions as exogenous in this paper, the cause could be time variations in the
frictions of ﬁnancial intermediation, investors’ risk aversion, or aggregate uncertainty and
information asymmetry. Earlier theoretical work on investment with ﬁnancial constraints
mostly focus on the demand side, i.e., the ﬁrm’s optimizing behavior taking the ﬁnancing
conditions as constant and time invariant. See Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Gomes (2001),
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007), Gamba and
Triantis (2008), Riddick and Whited (2009), Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2010), among others.
2 The Model
We build on BCW by introducing stochastic investment and external ﬁnancing conditions
into a ﬁrm’s dynamic investment, ﬁnancing, cash management, and hedging problem. Specif-
ically, we assume that the ﬁrm can be in one of two states, denoted by st = 1,2. In each
state, the ﬁrm faces diﬀerent ﬁnancing and investment opportunities. The state switches
from 1 to 2 (or from 2 to 1) over a short time interval ∆ with a constant probability ζ1∆
(or ζ2∆). For an analysis with a more general setup, see the appendix.
2.1 Production technology
The ﬁrm employs capital as the factor of production and the price of capital is normalized
to one. We denote by K and I respectively the ﬁrm’s capital stock and gross investment.
As is standard in capital accumulation models, the capital stock K evolves according to:
dKt = (It − δKt)dt, t ≥ 0, (1)
where δ ≥ 0 is the rate of depreciation.
The ﬁrm’s operating revenue at time t is proportional to its capital stock Kt, and is given
5by KtdAt, where dAt is the ﬁrm’s productivity shock over time increment dt. We assume
that




t is a standard Brownian motion and  (st) and σ(st) denote the expected return on
capital and its volatility in state st. The ﬁrm’s incremental operating proﬁt dYt over time
increment dt is then given by:
dYt = KtdAt − Itdt − Γ(It,Kt,st)dt, t ≥ 0, (3)
where Itdt is the investment over time dt and Γ(It,Kt,st)dt is the additional adjustment cost
that the ﬁrm incurs in the investment process. Note that we allow the adjustment costs to
be state dependent. Following the neoclassical investment literature (Hayashi (1982)), we
assume that the ﬁrm’s adjustment cost is homogeneous of degree one in I and K. In other
words, the adjustment cost takes the homogeneous form Γ(I,K,s) = gs(i)K, where i is the
ﬁrm’s investment capital ratio (i = I/K), and gs(i) is a state-dependent function that is
increasing and convex in i.4 Our analysis does not depend on the speciﬁc functional form of





where θs is the adjustment cost parameter and νs is a constant parameter.5
The ﬁrm can liquidate its assets at any time. The liquidation value Lt is proportional to
the ﬁrm’s capital at time t, but the liquidation value per unit of capital can change with the
state st, that is, Lt = lsKt, where ls is the recovery value per unit of capital in state s.
4For notational convenience we use the notation xs to denote a state dependent variable x(s) whenever
there is no ambiguity.
5In the literature, common choices of νs are either zero or the rate of deprecation δ. While the former
choice implies zero adjustment cost for zero gross investment, the latter choice implies a zero adjustment
cost when net investment is zero.
62.2 Stochastic Financing Opportunities
Neoclassical investment models (Hayashi (1982)) assume that the ﬁrm faces frictionless cap-
ital markets and that the Modigliani and Miller theorem holds. However, in reality, ﬁrms
face important ﬁnancing frictions for incentive, information asymmetry, and transaction cost
reasons.6 Our model incorporates a number of ﬁnancing costs that ﬁrms face in practice and
that empirical research has identiﬁed, while retaining an analytically tractable setting.
The ﬁrm may choose to use external ﬁnancing at any point in time. For simplicity, we
only consider external equity ﬁnancing as the source of external funds for the ﬁrm. We leave
the generalization of allowing the ﬁrm to also issue debt for future research. The ﬁrm incurs
a ﬁxed and a variable cost of issuing external equity. The ﬁxed cost is given by φsK, where
φs is the ﬁxed cost parameter in state s. As in BCW we take the ﬁxed cost to be proportional
to the ﬁrm’s capital stock K. This assumption ensures that the ﬁrm does not grow out of its
ﬁxed issuing costs. It is also analytically convenient, as it preserves the homogeneity of the
model in the ﬁrm’s capital stock K. The ﬁrm also incurs a (state dependent) proportional
issuance cost γs for each unit of external funds it raises. That is, after paying the ﬁxed cost
φsK, the ﬁrm pays γs > 0 in state s for each incremental dollar it raises.
We denote by:
1. H the process for the ﬁrm’s cumulative external ﬁnancing (so that dHt is the incre-
mental external ﬁnancing over time dt);
2. X the ﬁrm’s cumulative issuance costs;
3. W the process for the ﬁrm’s cash stock;
4. U the ﬁrm’s cumulative non-decreasing payout process to shareholders (so that dUt is
the incremental payout over time dt).
Distributing cash to shareholders may take the form of a special dividend or a share
6See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), and Myers and Majluf (1984), for example.
7repurchase.7 The beneﬁt of a payout is that shareholders can invest the proceeds at the
market rate of return and avoid paying a carry cost on the ﬁrm’s retained cash holdings. We
denote the unit cost of carrying cash inside the ﬁrm per unit of time by λ ≥ 0.8
If the ﬁrm runs out of cash (Wt = 0) it needs to raise external funds to continue operating
or its assets will be liquidated. If the ﬁrm chooses to raise new external funds to continue
operating, it must pay the ﬁnancing costs speciﬁed above. The ﬁrm may prefer liquidation
if the cost of ﬁnancing is too high relative to the continuation value (e.g., when the ﬁrm is
not productive, i.e., low  ). We denote by τ the ﬁrm’s stochastic liquidation time. Note
that τ = ∞ means that the ﬁrm never chooses to liquidate.
We may write the dynamics for the ﬁrm’s cash W as follows:
dWt = [KtdAt − Itdt − Γ(It,Kt,st)]dt + (r(st) − λ)Wtdt + dHt − dUt . (5)
where the ﬁrm term is the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows from operations dYt given in (3), the second
term is the return (net of the carry cost λ) on Wt, the third term dHt is the cash inﬂow from
external ﬁnancing, and the last term dUt is the cash outﬂow to investors, so that (dHt−dUt)
is the net cash ﬂow from ﬁnancing. Note that this is a completely general ﬁnancial accounting
equation, where dHt and dUt are endogenously determined by the ﬁrm.
The homogeneity assumptions embedded in the adjustment cost, the “AK” production
technology, and ﬁnancing costs allow us to deliver our key results in a parsimonious and
analytically tractable homogeneous model. Adjustment costs may not always be convex and
the production technology may exhibit long-run decreasing returns to scale in practice, but
7We cannot distinguish between a special dividend and a share repurchase, as we exclude taxes. Note,
however, that a commitment to regular dividend payments is suboptimal in our model. We also exclude any
ﬁxed or variable payout costs so as not to overburden the model. These can be added to the analysis
8The cost of carrying cash may arise from an agency problem or from tax distortions. Cash retentions
are tax disadvantaged because the associated tax rates generally exceed those on interest income (Graham
(2000)). Since there is a cost of hoarding cash λ the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to distribute cash back to
shareholders when its cash inventory grows too large. If λ = 0 the ﬁrm has no incentives to pay out cash
since keeping cash inside the ﬁrm does not have any disadvantages, but still has the beneﬁt of relaxing
ﬁnancial constraints. We could also imagine that there are settings in which λ ≤ 0. For example, if the ﬁrm
may have better investment opportunities than investors. We do not explore this case in this paper as we
are interested in a trade-oﬀ model for cash holdings.
8these functional forms substantially complicate the formal analysis.9 As will become clear
below, the homogeneity of our model in W and K allows us to reduce the dynamics to a
one-dimensional equation, which is relatively straightforward to solve.
2.3 Systematic Risk and the Pricing of Risk
There are two diﬀerent sources of systematic risks in our model: i) a small, continuous,
diﬀusion shock, and ii) a large discrete shock when the economy switches from one state
of nature to another. The diﬀusion shock in any given state s may be correlated with the
ﬁrm’s productivity shock, and we denote the correlation coeﬃcient by ρ. The discrete shock
aﬀects both the ﬁrm’s productivity and its external ﬁnancing costs, as we have highlighted
above.
How are these sources of systematic risk priced? Our model can allow for either risk-
neutral or risk-averse investors. If investors are risk neutral, then the pricing of risk is
zero and the physical probability distribution coincides with the risk-neutral probability
distribution. If investors are risk-averse, however, we need to distinguish between physical
and risk-neutral measures. We do so as follows.
For the diﬀusion risk, we assume that there is a constant market price of risk ηs in
each state s. The ﬁrm’s risk adjusted productivity shock (under the risk-neutral probability
measure Q) is then given by
dAt = ˆ  (st)dt + σ(st)d ˆ Z
A
t , (6)
where the mean productivity shock is adjusted to account for the ﬁrm’s exposure to diﬀusion
risk as follows:
ˆ  (st) ≡ ˆ  s =  s − ρηsσs,
and ˆ ZA
t is a standard Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability measure Q. 10
9See Hennessy and Whited (2005, 2007) for an analysis of a non-homogenous model.
10In the appendix, we provide a more detailed discussion of systematic risk premia. The key observation
9A risk-averse investor also requires a risk premium to compensate for the risk of the
economy switching states. As we show in the appendix, this involves transforming the
transition intensity under the physical probability measure to the risk-neutral probability
measure Q as follows: let ˆ ζ1 and ˆ ζ2 denote the transition intensities from respectively state
1 to state 2 (and state 2 to state 1) under the risk-neutral measure, then these intensities
are related to their physical intensities as follows:
ˆ ζ1 = e
κ1ζ1 , and ˆ ζ2 = e
κ2ζ2 ,
where κ1 = ln(ˆ ζ1/ζ1) and κ2 = ln(ˆ ζ2/ζ2) represent a form of risk premium required by a
risk-averse investor for the exposure to this jump risk.
Note that a positive κs implies that ˆ ζs > ζs. In other words, when κs is positive it
is as if a risk-averse investor perceived a higher transition intensity under the risk-neutral
probability measure than under the physical measure. Vice versa, a negative κs implies that
ˆ ζs < ζs. In other words, the perceived transition intensity for a risk-averse investor under
the risk-neutral measure is lower. As we show in the appendix, κs is positive in one state
and negative in the other. Intuitively, this reﬂects the idea that a risk-averse investor makes
an upward adjustment of the transition intensity from the good to the bad state (with κs > 0)
and a downward adjustment of the transition intensity from the bad to the good state (with
κs < 0). In sum, it is as if a risk-averse investor were uniformly more ‘pessimistic’ than a
risk-neutral investor: she thinks ‘good times’ are likely to last shorter and ‘bad times’ longer.
2.4 Firm optimality
The ﬁrm chooses its investment I, cumulative payout policy U, cumulative external ﬁnancing
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, (7)
is that the adjustment from the physical to the risk-neutral probability measure reﬂects a representative
risk-averse investor’s stochastic discount factor (SDF) in a dynamic asset-pricing model.
10where ru denotes the interest rate at time u. The ﬁrst term is the discounted value of payouts
to shareholders, and the second term is the discounted value upon liquidation. Note that
optimality may imply that the ﬁrm never liquidates. In that case, we simply have τ = ∞.
3 Model Solution
3.1 First-best Benchmark
We begin by characterizing the solution in the neoclassical benchmark, where there are no
external ﬁnancing costs, φs = γs = 0. In the neoclassical (frictionless-markets) solution
ﬁrms hold no cash (W = 0) and the optimal investment is determined by Tobin’s q, which
is the ratio of the market value and replacement value of capital. As Hayashi (1982) has
ﬁrst established, marginal q is equal to average (Tobin’s) q in the ﬁrst-best benchmark due
to the homogeneity in K of the production and adjustment-cost functions.










































Note ﬁrst that Tobin’s q is greater than one only due to the presence of investment adjust-
ment cost. Second, as described in the system of equations (8), ﬁrm value in the ﬁrst-best
benchmark, qFB
s in state s (normalized by the ﬁrm’s capital stock K), is the sum of the
present value of expected earnings net of investment and adjustment costs per unit of capi-
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. In the two-state model,
iFB
s and qFB
s can be solved in closed form by mapping this system of bi-variate quadratic
11equations into a quartic equation.
3.2 Second-best Solution
Let P(K,W,s) denote ﬁrm value when the ﬁrm faces positive external ﬁnancing costs (φs > 0
and γs ≥ 0) in state s, with capital K and cash holding W. Firm value P(K,W,s) then
satisﬁes the following system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations when its cash
holding is above the ﬁnancing-liquidation boundary Ws and below the payout boundary
W s, i.e., for W s ≤ W ≤ W s,
rsP(K,W,s) = max
I











where s− denotes the other state.
Intuitively, the ﬁrst and the second terms on the right side of the HJB equation (10) give
the eﬀects of the expected change (drift) and volatility of cash holding W on ﬁrm value,
respectively. The third term gives the eﬀect of the expected change of capital stock K on
ﬁrm value. The last term gives the expected change of ﬁrm value due to the change of the
state from s to s−. When ˆ ζs = 0, we uncover the special case where the ﬁrm remains forever
in the same state (the case treated in BCW).
As in BCW, ﬁrm value is homogeneous of degree one in W and K within each state. We
may write P(K,W,s) = ps(w)K, and substitute it into (10) and simplifying, we then obtain
the following system of ordinary diﬀerential equations (ODE) for ps(w):
rsps(w) = max
is









+ (is − δ)(ps (w) − wp
′
s (w)) + ˆ ζs (ps− (w) − ps (w)). (11)












s(w) is the marginal value of cash in state s.















s(ws) = 1, (14)
which states that the marginal value of cash is one when the ﬁrm chooses to pay out cash.




s(ws) = 0. (15)
In contrast, the lower endogenous ﬁnancing boundary in state s is determined by a
fundamentally diﬀerent trade-oﬀ than in the single-state model in BCW. Let ws = Ws/K
denote the endogenous lower boundary for equity issuance in state s, and let ms denote the
“return target” ﬁnancing level in state s per unit of capital. A key result in BCW is that
the ﬁrm never chooses to raise external equity before it exhausts its cash stock. That is, in
BCW the ﬁrm optimally chooses w = 0. The reason is that the ﬁrm always has the option
to raise external equity ﬁnancing in the future, and market ﬁnancing terms do not change
over time (i.e., ﬁnancing opportunities are constant). The ﬁrm is therefore better oﬀ relying
ﬁrst on its cheaper internal funds before turning to external ﬁnancing. As is highlighted in
BCW, this is a form of dynamic pecking order of ﬁnancing.
When ﬁnancing opportunities are changing, however, as they are in our setting here, it
is no longer necessarily optimal to set w = 0. It may now be optimal for the ﬁrm to time
13the market and issue equity before it runs out of cash, if it is concerned that ﬁnancing costs
could rise in the future. That is, the option to tap cheaper equity markets now even though
the ﬁrm has not run out of cash can be an optimal strategy if the cheap ﬁnancing terms are
not permanent.
Given any equity issuance boundary ws, however, we have the same value matching and
smooth pasting conditions at issuance as in BCW. These allow us, in particular, to determine
the return target ms:
ps(ws) = ps(ms) − φs − (1 + γs)(ms − ws), (16)
p
′
s(ms) = 1 + γs. (17)
If the ﬁrm chooses to raise external equity, it ﬁrst pays the ﬁxed equity issuance cost
φs per unit of capital and then incurs the marginal issuance cost γs for each unit of equity
it raises. The condition (16) thus gives the accounting relation for ﬁrm value immediately
before and after issuance. Second, as the ﬁrm optimally chooses its external ﬁnancing at the
margin it sets ms so that marginal beneﬁt of issuance p′
s(ms) is equal to the marginal cost
1 + γs, which yields condition (17).
How does the ﬁrm determine its equity issuance boundary ws? We use the following
two-step procedure. First, suppose that the optimal lower boundary ws is interior (ws > 0),
then, the standard optimality condition implies that the derivatives of the left and the right
sides of (16) with respect to ws should be equal. This argument gives the following condition:
p
′
s(ws) = 1 + γs. (18)
If there exists no ws such that the above condition holds, we obtain a corner solution, ws = 0.
In that case, the option value to tap equity markets earlier than absolutely necessary is valued
at zero. Using this procedure, we can characterize the optimal lower boundary ws ≥ 0.
Next, we need to determine whether costly external equity issuance or liquidation is
optimal, as the ﬁrm always has the option to liquidate. Under our assumptions, the ﬁrm’s
14capital is productive and thus its going-concern value is higher than its liquidation value.
Therefore, the ﬁrm never chooses to exercise its liquidation option before it runs out cash.
Under liquidation, we then have
ps(0) = ls. (19)
Hence, the ﬁrm chooses costly equity issuance as long as the equilibrium ﬁrm value ps(0) is
greater than ls.
Finally, we specify the value function outside of the ﬁnancing and payout boundary. If
the ﬁrm has too much cash in state s (so that w > ws) it will reduce its cash holding to ws
immediately by making a lump-sum payout. That is, we have
ps (w) = ps (ws) + (w − ws) , w > ws . (20)
This scenario is possible when the ﬁrm with high cash holding moves into a state with a
lower payout boundary.
Similarly, when the ﬁrm suddenly transits from the state s− with the ﬁnancing boundary
ws− into the other state s with a higher ﬁnancing boundary (ws > ws−) and its cash holding
lies between the two lower ﬁnancing boundaries (ws− < w < ws) it is then optimal for the
ﬁrm to immediately issue external equity and restore its cash balance to the target level ms.
The following equation describes this rebalancing:
ps(w) = ps(ms) − φs − (1 + γs)(ms − w), w ≤ ws. (21)
In the remainder of the paper, we use this model framework to study several scenarios.
In Section 4, we consider the case where the ﬁrm is attempting to survive a ﬁnancial crisis
during with ﬁnancial markets are temporarily shut down. In Section 5, we consider the
situation where the ﬁrm expects to transit from the good state, denoted by G, in which
external costs of ﬁnancing are low, to the other state, denoted by B, where the costs of
ﬁnancing are high. And in section 8 we consider the general case where the ﬁrm’s environment
15transits between two recurrent states B and G.
4 Fighting for Survival in a Crisis
Our ﬁrst scenario captures the situation faced by ﬁrms in the midst of a ﬁnancial crisis. Much
empirical work has shown, ﬁrms in such an environment scramble to survive by cutting back
capital expenditures, drawing down lines of credit, and (when possible) engaging in asset
sales so as to preserve cash.11 In this section we analyze how ﬁrms optimally manage their
ﬁnances when their priority is to survive in a severe but temporary ﬁnancial crisis. To make
our notation more intuitive, we use state G to refer to the good state, in which ﬁnancial
markets operate normally. We set the ﬁxed cost of equity issuance to 1% of the ﬁrm’s
capital stock in this state (φG = 1%) and the marginal cost of issuance to γG = 6%. We
also set the liquidation value of assets to lG = 1.1. State B is the ﬁnancial crisis (bad) state,
where the market for external ﬁnancing shuts down. Should the ﬁrm run out of cash in this
state it would be forced into liquidation. During a ﬁnancial crisis, few investors have either
suﬃciently deep pockets or the risk appetite to acquire assets. This leads to ﬁre sale prices
of assets and low liquidation values12 For these reasons, we set lB = 0.7.
The other parameters remain the same in the two states: the riskfree rate is r = 4.34%,
the risk-adjusted mean and volatility of the productivity shock are ˆ   = 21.2% and σ = 20%,
the rate of depreciation of capital is δ = 15%, the adjustment cost parameters are θ = 6.902
and ν = 12%.13 Finally, the cash-carrying cost is λ = 1.5%. Although in reality these
parameter values clearly change with the state of nature, we keep them ﬁxed under this
scenario so as to isolate the eﬀects of changes in external ﬁnancing conditions. All the
parameter values are annualized whenever applicable and summarized in Table 1.
To make our point in the simplest possible setting, consider a ﬁrm currently in the
11See Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009), and Campello, Giambona,
Graham, and Harvey (2010).
12See Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, Acharya and Viswanathan, 2010, Campello, Graham and Harvey, 2009).
13Other than the volatility parameter, we rely on the technology parameters estimated by Eberly, Rebelo,
and Vincent (2009).
16ﬁnancial crisis (state B), and that the state G is absorbing, i.e., once the ﬁrm reaches state
G, it remains there permanently (ζG = 0). The ﬁrm exits the crisis state with transition
probability ζB∆ over time period ∆, and as a benchmark we set ζB = 0.9, which implies
that the average duration of a ﬁnancial crisis is 1.1 years. Under the risk-neutral measure,
with a pricing of risk with respect to changes in the state of nature of κG = −κB = ln(3),
the corresponding risk-neutral transition intensity is ˆ ζB = 0.3.
The ﬁrm’s behavior in the absorbing state G is identical to that in the model with
constant ﬁnancing opportunities in BCW. Figure 1 plots the average q and its derivative,
as well as the investment-capital ratio i(w) and its derivative in this state. The average q
is a natural measure of the value of capital. It is deﬁned as the ratio between the ﬁrm’s




= ps(w) − w. (22)





s(w) − 1. (23)
We may interpret q′
s(w) as the (net) marginal value of cash, as it measures how much the
ﬁrm’s enterprise value increases with an extra dollar of cash. The ﬁrm’s investment-capital
ratio is(w) and investment-cash sensitivity i′
s(w) in each state are given by equations (12)
and (13), respectively.
After reaching the absorbing state G, the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing follows a strict pecking order
with internal funds always tapped before external funds, so that wG = 0. The return target
for equity issuance, which is also the total amount of equity issuance due to wG = 0, is
mG = 0.17, and the payout boundary is wG = 0.49 (each marked by a vertical line in the
graphs). As w rises, the ﬁnancial constraint is relaxed. As a result, both the average q
and investment rise with w, while the net marginal value of cash and the investment-cash
sensitivity fall with w. Obviously, the transition intensity ζB into the absorbing state has
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Figure 1: Firm value and investment in (absorbing) state G. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment in state G for the case where G is absorbing. Costly external ﬁnancing
is available in state G, but not in B. All parameter values are given in Table 1.
no impact on the results in the absorbing state G.
Next, we turn to the crisis state B, where the ﬁrm’s overriding concern is survival due
to the lack of any external ﬁnancing. The ﬁrm also anticipates an improvement in ﬁnancing
opportunities when the state of the economy switches back to normal. Thus, a rise in the
probability of leaving the crisis state can have two eﬀects. First, it might encourage the ﬁrm
to invest with the hope that external ﬁnancing will become available soon. Second, it raises
the continuation value for the ﬁrm, which makes the ﬁrm place extra weight on survival in
order to preserve its going concern value. The tradeoﬀ between these two eﬀects determines
how the ﬁrm times payout and investment in the crisis state.
Figure 2 plots the average q and investment in state B. Panel A plots qB(w) and gives
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C. investment-capital ratio: iB(w)
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D. investment-cash sensitivity: i′
B(w)
cash-capital ratio: w = W/K
ˆ ζB = 0
ˆ ζB = 0.3
ˆ ζB = 1.0
Figure 2: Firm value and investment in (transitory) state B. This ﬁgure plots
the average q and investment in state B for the case where G is absorbing. Costly external
ﬁnancing is available in state G, but not in B. We consider three risk-neutral transition intensities
ˆ ζB = 0,0.3,1.0. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.
the optimal payout boundary wB in the transitory state B. We consider three levels of
risk-neutral transition intensity, ˆ ζB = 0,0.3,1, which corresponds to ζB = 0,0.9,3 under
the physical measure. Regardless of the transition intensity, the average q always starts at
lB = 0.7 due to liquidation at w = 0. When the probability of exiting a crisis increases, ﬁrm
value rises, and the ﬁrm responds by reducing its cash holding. The payout boundary wB
falls from 0.78 to 0.76 and then to 0.68 as ˆ ζB rises from 0 to 0.3 and then to 1.0.
It is worth noting that the payout boundary in state B is not always monotonic in ˆ ζB. For
very high and very low transition intensities the ﬁrm pays out sooner than for intermediate
intensities. The reason is that when the ﬁrm is stuck in the crisis state for a long time the
19value of its investment opportunities is so low that it is best to payout cash to shareholders.
When the probability of exiting the crisis is very high then the prospect of raising cheap
equity in the future also encourages the ﬁrm to pay out more dividends in the crisis state.
It is for intermediate probabilities, when the value of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities is
relatively high, but the risk of staying in a prolonged crisis is also high, that the ﬁrm is most
conservative in its payout policy.
However, even when the crisis is expected to end quickly (e.g., ˆ ζB = 1 corresponds
to ζB = 3, which implies the average duration of state B is only 0.33 years), the payout
boundary is still signiﬁcantly higher than in the good state (wG = 0.49), suggesting that the
ﬁrm has a strong desire to hold more cash in the crisis state. The graph also shows that
moving from state B to G can result in a big jump in ﬁrm value when the cash holding is low,
but the eﬀect is much smaller when the cash holding is high. This diﬀerence reﬂects the fact
that the ﬁrm uses precautionary savings to cushion the impact of severe ﬁnancial constraints.
One implication of this ﬁnding is that we should not expect to see sharp increases in stock
valuations for cash rich ﬁrms as the economy exits the crisis state.
Panel B plots the net marginal value of cash q′
B(w) in state B. As w approaches 0,
the marginal value of cash rises signiﬁcantly because an extra dollar of cash can reduce the
chance of costly liquidation. While the net marginal value of cash in state G reaches at most
$0.2 as w → 0, it can be as high as $6 in state B. Again, this is due to the fact that the
ﬁrm has access to external ﬁnancing in state G but not in state B.
Interestingly, when cash holdings w are relatively high the marginal value of cash in
state B decreases with the transition intensity ˆ ζB, while it increases with ˆ ζB when w is
low. This result might appear counter-intuitive, as a higher probability of ending the crisis
ought to help relax the ﬁnancial constraint the ﬁrm is facing. Intuitively, the severity of
ﬁnancial constraints depends on the probability of the ﬁrm running out of cash before the
crisis ends. When current cash holding is high, a higher ˆ ζB makes liquidation less likely,
hence reducing the importance of hoarding cash today. However, when the ﬁrm is facing an
immediate liquidation threat, yet the chance of the crisis ending in the near future is high,
20the “breathing room” provided by an extra dollar of cash can be especially valuable, which
explains why the marginal value of cash rises with ˆ ζB. Notice that for w > 0, the marginal
value of cash should eventually decrease in ˆ ζB as ˆ ζB becomes large, since the high intensity
eventually makes liquidation concerns irrelevant.14
The behavior of the marginal value of cash is key to understanding the ﬁrm’s investment
policy. As Panel C shows, the investment-capital ratio iB(w) in state B is increasing in
w. This result is driven by the rise in ﬁrm value and the fall in marginal value of cash
with w. With suﬃciently high w, investment increases with ˆ ζB. But the opposite is true
when w is low. Underinvestment is a form of risk management for a ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrm. When the ﬁrm does not face an immediate threat of liquidation, a higher transition
intensity ˆ ζB further reduces the need to save cash and hence makes the ﬁrm more willing
to invest. However, if the cash holding is already low, a higher ˆ ζB can induce the ﬁrm to
underinvest more in order to avoid running out of cash before the end of the crisis. The
diﬀerent investment policy at the lower and higher ends of w highlights the importance of a
dynamic risk management perspective.
Panel D of Figure 2 shows that the investment-cash sensitivity i′
B(w) is positive but non-
monotonic in w. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that investment increases with net worth
(i′(w) > 0) but cannot sign i′′(w) in their static setting. In the scenario we illustrate here,
the sensitivity i′(w) is positive, and indeed can be either increasing or decreasing in w.
In summary, when current external ﬁnancing is impossible but may be available in the
future, the potential change of ﬁnancing terms in the future aﬀects the ﬁrm’s payout and
investment policies. From the comparative statics for ˆ ζB, we can conjecture the implications
of a time-varying transition intensity in a dynamic setting. When ˆ ζB rises, which can be
either because the expected duration of the crisis is getting shorter (ˆ ζB falls), or because
investors are less concerned with the crisis state (the risk premium for ﬁnancing shocks falls),
ﬁrm value will rise, ﬁrms will tend to hold less cash, and investment may be falling for ﬁrms
with low cash holdings (despite the fact that expected future ﬁnancing costs are falling) but
14The exception is at the limit as w approaches 0, where one can prove that the marginal value of cash
will be monotonically increasing in ˆ ζB.
21rising for ﬁrms with high cash holdings.
5 Market Timing: Building a War-chest in Good Times
In this section, we consider a setting where the ﬁrm is currently in state G. However, the
economy may switch out of state G to enter the crisis state B with probability ζG∆ over the
time interval ∆. Moreover, in state B the ﬁrm cannot access external ﬁnancing and can only
survive on internal funds. Thus, under the scenario considered in this section the ﬁrm has
an external ﬁnancing window only in state G, and this window has limited duration. Unlike
in the previous section, we show that the option to time the market has signiﬁcant value.
This predictable worsening of ﬁnancing conditions generates a positive timing-option
value for the ﬁrm. By tapping external equity markets while there is still time, the ﬁrm can
build a cash war chest for the future. By deferring external ﬁnancing, it would save on the
time value of money for ﬁnancing costs and also on subsequent cash carry costs. However,
doing so would then take a risk of being shut out of capital markets forever before it had
time to accumulate cash. Facing this tradeoﬀ, the ﬁrm chooses its external equity issuance
policy together with its investment and payout policies to maximize its value.
The ﬁrm’s behavior in the absorbing state B is essentially the same as in BCW. Figure 3
plots the average q and i(w) in the absorbing state B. If the ﬁrm runs out of cash in state B,
the inability to raise external funds results in immediate liquidation. Average q thus is equal
to the liquidation value lB = 0.7 at w = 0. Also, average q is concave in w (as in BCW). The
net marginal value of cash q′
B(w) can be as high as 3.5 when the ﬁrm is close to runnning
out of cash, but it decreases to 0 monotonically as we w increases from 0 to the endogenous
payout boundary wB. As in BCW, investment is increasing but is not necessarily concave
in cash: from Panels C and D one can see that i′(w) is positive but not monotonic.
Next we turn to the transitory state G, Figure 4 plots ﬁrm value, investment, and their
sensitivities in state G for three levels of risk-neutral transition intensity ˆ ζG = 0, 0.3, 1.0
from state G to B, which corresponds to ζG = 0, 0.1, 1/3 under the physical measure.
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Figure 3: Firm value and investment in (absorbing) state B. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment in state B for the case where B is absorbing. Costly external ﬁnancing
is not available in state B. All parameter values are given in Table 1.
Panel A plots average q. Intuitively, the higher is the transition intensity from G to
B (the higher ˆ ζG) the lower is ﬁrm value for the same cash-capital ratio w. Importantly,
when ˆ ζG is suﬃciently high ﬁrm value is no longer globally concave in w. Since ﬁnancial
constraints typically induce the ﬁrm to hoard cash for precautionary reasons, ﬁrm value is
increasing and concave in ﬁnancial slack in almost all models featuring ﬁnancial constraints.
In our scenario, the precautionary motive for hoarding cash is still present. Yet, stochastic
ﬁnancing conditions also introduce a motive to time equity markets, which potentially results
in a locally convex ﬁrm value.
From Panel B, it is easy to see that ﬁrm value is not globally concave in w. For suﬃciently
high w (w ≥ 0.17 with ˆ ζG = 0.3 and w ≥ 0.26 with ˆ ζG = 1) qG(w) is concave. When the
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ˆ ζG = 0
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Figure 4: Firm value and investment in (transitory) state G. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment in state G for the case where G is transitory. Costly external ﬁnancing
is available in state G, but not in B. We consider three transition probabilities ˆ ζG = 0, 0.3, 1.0.
All other parameter values are given in Table 1.
ﬁrm has suﬃcient cash, the ﬁrm’s equity issuance need is then quite distant so that the
ﬁnancing timing option is out-of-the-money. Recall that the sign of i′(w) is determined by
p′′
G(w) (see equation 13). Hence, the concavity of pG(w) in the cash rich region also implies
that investment responds positively to increases in cash in that region, which is conﬁrmed
in Panels C and D of Figure 4. To sum up, with suﬃcient ﬁnancial slack, the ﬁrm behaves
eﬀectively in the same way as in standard models with ﬁnancial constraints (e.g. BCW).
In contrast, when w is low (e.g. w ≤ 0.17 with ˆ ζG = 0.3 and w ≤ 0.26 with ˆ ζG = 1) the
ﬁrm is more concerned about the risk of being shut out of capital markets when the state
switches to B. A ﬁrm with low cash holdings may want to issue equity while it can, even
24before running out of cash. In addition, such a ﬁrm may choose to accelerate its cash burn
rate by increasing its investments, to bring forward the time when it raises new funds through
equity issuance. Also, due to the ﬁxed costs of issuing equity, the ﬁrm will engage in a lumpy
equity issue when it chooses to tap equity markets. This means that post issuance the ﬁrm
will have high cash holdings. Thus when w is low, the expectation of high post issuance cash
reserves coupled with the inclination to time favorable equity markets dominates the ﬁrm’s
precautionary motive, resulting in a locally convex-shaped ﬁrm value in w.
How does the transition intensity out of state G aﬀect ﬁrms’ market timing motive?
Consider ﬁrst the limiting case when state G is absorbing (ˆ ζG = 0). In this case, the
ﬁrm taps equity markets only when it runs out of cash (wG = 0), and to economize the
ﬁxed cost of issuance, the ﬁrm issues a lumpy amount mG = 0.17. Firm value qG(w) is
then globally concave in w and iG(w) increases with w everywhere. Note in particular that
the ﬁxed issuance cost by itself is not suﬃcient to generate market timing behavior. The
transitory nature of favorable market conditions is necessary to induce the ﬁrm to time
the market. As the transition intensity ˆ ζG rises above 0 the equity issuance boundary wG
may possibly move above 0. In these situations, the optimality condition for the issuance
boundary requires that the net marginal value of cash at the issuance boundary be equal to
the proportional ﬁnancing cost γ = 6%. As one would expect, the return cash-capital ratio,
mG, is also increasing in the transition intensity (as can be seen in Panel A), since a higher
likelihood of an impending ﬁnancial crisis raises the ﬁrm’s precautionary demand for cash.
The ﬁrm also chooses to preserve more cash in response to an increase in ˆ ζG by postponing
payouts to shareholders. This can be seen from the shift to the right for the optimal payout
boundary wG as ˆ ζG rises. In sum, Panel A shows that through a combination of market
timing and reduced payout, the ﬁrm optimally responds to a greater crisis risk by holding
more cash on average.
Besides the ﬁnite duration of the option to time the equity market, the ﬁxed issuance
cost is also necessary to obtain local convexity of the value function. In Figure 5, we examine
average q and investment in the transitory state G for three levels of ﬁxed cost of equity
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Figure 5: The eﬀects of ﬁnancing costs on ﬁrm value and investment in (transitory)
state G. This ﬁgure plots ﬁrm value and investment in state G for the case where G is transitory.
We consider three levels of ﬁxed costs of equity ﬁnancing in state G: φG = 0, 1%, 5%. The transition
intensity is ˆ ζG = 0.3. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.
ﬁnancing φ = 0, 1%, 5% (with transition intensity ˆ ζG = 0.3). Note ﬁrst that the lower the
ﬁxed cost parameter φ is the earlier the ﬁrm issues equity in state G. Intuitively, the ﬁrm
exercises the ﬁnancing option earlier if the cost of doing so is lower. In Panel A, as φG drops
from 5% to 1% and then to 0, the ﬁnancing boundary w rises from 0 to 0.08 and then to
0.24. Second, without the ﬁxed cost (φG = 0), the ﬁrm issues just enough equity to stay
away from its optimally chosen ﬁnancing boundary w, as the net marginal value of cash
cannot be higher than the marginal cost of ﬁnancing γ. In this extreme case, the marginal
value of cash q′
G(w) is monotonically decreasing in w as can be seen from Panel B; hence,
ﬁrm value is globally concave in w even under market timing. Thus, stochastic ﬁnancing
26costs and ﬁxed costs are both necessary to generate convexity.15
When the ﬁxed cost of issuing equity is positive but not very high (φG = 1% or 5%)
the marginal value of cash is no longer monotonic in w. Moreover, higher ﬁxed costs lead
ﬁrms to choose larger issuance sizes (mG − wG). Notice also that wG = 0 when φG = 5%.
This result shows that market timing does not necessarily lead to a violation of the pecking
order between internal cash and external equity ﬁnancing, and importantly that wG > 0
is not necessary for the convexity of the value function. Finally, when the ﬁxed cost of
issuing equity is very high (not shown in the graph), the market timing eﬀect is so weak
that the precautionary motive dominates again, so that the net marginal value of cash is
monotonically decreasing in w.
Having determined why the value function may be locally convex, we now explore the
implications of convexity for investment. Recall from equation (13) that the sign of the
investment-cash sensitivity i′
s(w) depends on p′′
s(w). Thus, in the region where pG(w) is
convex, investment is decreasing in cash holdings w. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to the
standard result in the investment with ﬁnancial constraint literature, where investment is
always positively related with w. Indeed, in all existing models with ﬁnancial constraints in-
vestment increases with ﬁnancial slack. Existing models only diﬀer in their results concerning
investment-cash sensitivity (the sign of the second derivative i′′(w)).16
The economic reason for why investment may be locally decreasing in ﬁnancial slack is
related to market timing. When the ﬁrm’s cash holding is low, it wants to take advantage
of the favorable ﬁnancing condition in state G before it disappears. As a result, rather
than cutting investment further to avoid further reducing the cash holding, the ﬁrm actu-
ally wants to accelerate investment in order to reach the equity issuance boundary sooner.
Also anticipating equity issuance, it is less worthwhile for the ﬁrm to signiﬁcantly distort
investment. The optionality of issuing equity generates convexity. Simply put, the ﬁrm is
15More generally, the value of the market timing option depends on the diﬀerence in ﬁnancing costs between
the two states: either lowering the ﬁnancing costs in state G or raising the ﬁnancing costs in state B (or
making liquidation more costly in state B) will lead the ﬁrm to issue equity early.
16See Kaplan and Zingales’ (KZ) discussion of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). See also Stein
(2003) for a survey on the issue of investment/cash sensitivity.
27more willing to invest when higher investment reduces the chance of missing out on favorable
equity ﬁnancing conditions, and when it expects its cash holding to substantially increase
post equity issue. This behavior is shown in Panels C and D of Figure 4 and 5. Our model
is thus able to account for the behavior that the threat of high ﬁnancing costs in the future
can cause changes in investment and cash holding to be negatively correlated.
There may be other ways of generating a negative correlation between changes in in-
vestment and cash holding. First, when the ﬁrm moves from state G to B, this not only
results in a drop in investment, especially when w is low (comparing Panel C in Figure 3
and 4), but also in an increase in the payout boundary, which may explain why ﬁrms during
the recent ﬁnancial crisis have increased their cash reserves and cut back on capital expen-
ditures, as Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2010) have documented. Second, in a model
with persistent productivity shocks (as in Riddick and Whited (2009)), when expected future
productivity falls, the ﬁrm will cut investment and the cash saved could also result in a rise
in its cash holding.17
Is it possible to distinguish empirically between these two mechanisms? In the case
of a negative productivity shock the ﬁrm has no incentive to signiﬁcantly raise its payout
boundary, as lower productivity lowers the costs of underinvestment, hence reducing the
precautionary motive for holding cash. This prediction is opposite to the prediction related
to a negative ﬁnancing shock. Thus, following negative technology shocks we will not see
ﬁrms aggressively increasing cash reserves. In fact, ﬁrms that already have high cash holdings
will likely pay out cash after a negative productivity shock, but hold on to even more cash
after a negative ﬁnancing shock.
Another empirical prediction which diﬀerentiates our model from other market timing
models concerns the link between equity issuance and corporate investment. Our model
predicts that underinvestment is substantially mitigated when the ﬁrm is close to the eq-
uity ﬁnancing boundary. Moreover, the positive correlation between investment and equity
issuance in our model is not driven by better investment opportunities (as the real side of
17This mechanism is captured in our model with the two states corresponding to two diﬀerent values for
the return on capital µs.
28the economy is held constant across the two states) it is driven solely by the market timing
and precautionary demand for cash.
6 Financial Constraints and the Risk Premium
In this section, we explore how ﬁnancial constraints and time-varying external equity issuance
costs aﬀect the ﬁrm’s cost of capital. A heuristic derivation of the ﬁrm’s (risk-adjusted)
expected return involves a comparison of the HJB equations under the physical and risk-
neutral measures P and Q. Let the ﬁrm’s conditional risk premium in state s be  R
s (w). We
may write the HJB equation under the physical measure as follows
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s(w)) + ζs (ps− (w) − ps (w)),
where  s and ζs denote the expected excess return on capital and the transition intensity
from state s to s− under the physical probability measure, respectively.
By matching terms in the HJB equations (11) and (24), one then obtains the following
expression for the conditional risk premium:
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, (25)
where ρs is the conditional correlation between the ﬁrm’s productivity shock dA and the
stochastic discount factor in state s.18 The ﬁrst term in (25) is the technology risk premium,
which is the product of the ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic Brownian risk ρsσsp′
s(w)/ps(w) and
the price of Brownian risk ηs. It is positive for ﬁrms whose values are positively correlated
with aggregate technology shocks. The ratio p′
s(w)/ps(w) measures the percentage change
of ﬁrm value with respect to a unit change in w. The second term is the ﬁnancing risk
18This expression can also be obtained via the standard covariance between return and stochastic discount
factor derivation (see e.g., Duﬃe (2001)).
29premium, which compensates risk-averse investors for the exposure to the ﬁrm’s risk with
respect to time-varying equity issuance costs. Since the stochastic discount factor (marginal
utility) jumps up when ﬁnancing conditions deteriorate we naturally have κG = −κB > 0
in our two state model: risk-averse investors demand this extra premium for ﬁrms whose
values drop during times when external ﬁnancing conditions worsen (pG(w) > pB(w)).19
Note that in the ﬁrst-best setting where there are no equity issuance costs, the ﬁrm’s
expected risk premium is constant and can be recovered from (25) by setting η, ρ, and σ to





FB (rm − r) , (26)
where β
FB = ρσ/(σmqFB), (rm − r) is the excess market portfolio return, and σm is the
market portfolio volatility.
The comparison between  R(w) and  FB highlights the impact of external ﬁnancing
frictions on the ﬁrm’s cost of capital:
Constant equity issuance costs: When ﬁnancing opportunities are constant over time,
ﬁnancial constraints only aﬀect the cost of capital by amplifying (or dampening) a
ﬁrm’s exposure to technology shocks. This eﬀect is captured by the technology (dif-
fusion) risk premium in (25). As the cash-capital ratio w increases, the ﬁrm tends
to become less risky for two reasons. First, if a greater fraction of its assets is cash,
the ﬁrm beta is automatically lower due to a simple portfolio composition eﬀect. As
a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm hoards more cash to reduce its dependence on costly
external ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm beta becomes a weighted average of its asset beta and the
beta of cash, which is equal to zero. In particular, with a large enough buﬀer stock of
cash relative to its assets, this ﬁrm may be even safer than a ﬁrm facing no external
ﬁnancing costs and therefore holding no cash. Second, an increase in w eﬀectively re-
laxes the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing constraint and therefore reduces the sensitivity of ﬁrm value
19Livdan, Sapriza, and Zhang (2009) also study the eﬀect of ﬁnancing constraints on stock returns. Their
model, however, does not allow for stochastic ﬁnancing conditions or cash accumulation.
30to cash ﬂow, which also tends to reduce the risk of holding the ﬁrm.
Time-varying equity issuance costs: Time-varying equity issuance costs aﬀect the cost
of capital for a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm in two ways. First, the ﬁrm’s exposure to
technology shocks changes as ﬁnancing conditions change, as the marginal value of cash
p′
s(w) and ﬁrm value ps(w) both depend on the state s. Second, when external ﬁnancing
shocks are priced, investors demand an extra premium for investing in ﬁrms that do
poorly when ﬁnancing conditions worsen. This eﬀect is captured by the second term in
(25). Note that (ps− (w) − ps (w))/ps (w) gives the percentage change of ﬁrm value if
ﬁnancing conditions change, and this term measures the sensitivity of ﬁrm value with
respect to changes in w. Intuitively, the ﬁnancing risk premium is larger the bigger
the relative change in ﬁrm value due to a change in external ﬁnancing conditions.
Figure 6 plots the conditional risk premium for a ﬁrm as a function of w. Recall that
state G (with low ﬁnancing costs) is transient and state B (with high ﬁnancing costs) is
absorbing. We set the price of Brownian risk to ηG = ηB = 0.4, and the correlation between
the aggregate and ﬁrm level Brownian shocks to ρG = ρB = 0.6. The remaining parameters
are the same as in the benchmark case and are reported in Table 1. The risk premium for
an unconstrained ﬁrm in the ﬁrst-best setting is then  FB = 3.2%.
In Panel A, the total risk premium in state B is shown to be decreasing in the ﬁrm’s cash
holding. When w is close to 0, the annualized conditional risk premium can exceed 30%,
but it falls rapidly as w rises. This result mirrors the rapid decline in the marginal value
of cash (see Figure 3, Panel B): thus, high marginal value of cash in the low w region can
dramatically amplify the ﬁrm’s sensitivity to technology shocks relative to the unconstrained
case. The risk premium can be as low as 2% for a ﬁrm near the payout boundary–even lower
than the total risk premium for a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm (3.2%). This is due to the
asset composition eﬀect discussed earlier. As the ﬁrm approaches the payout boundary, the
marginal value of cash p′
B(w) approaches 1. By deﬁnition, pB(w) = qB(w) + w. While the
average q for the constrained ﬁrm will always be below the q under the ﬁrst best, qFB, the
sum of average q and w can exceed qFB, which causes  R
B(w) to fall below  FB.









A. total risk premium in state B








B. total risk premium in state G
 
 







cash-capital ratio: w = W/K
C. technology risk premium in state G
 
 









cash-capital ratio: w = W/K
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Figure 6: The eﬀects of stochastic ﬁnancing conditions on the cost of capital. This
ﬁgure plots ﬁrm risk premium in state G and B for the case where G is transitory. We consider
three levels of transition intensity from G to B: ˆ ζG = 0,0.3,1.0.
In Panel B, the total risk premium in state G also decreases when the ﬁrm’s cash holding
rises. Compared to state B, the level of risk premium is lower, especially when the ﬁrm has
low cash holdings. Moreover, a higher probability of switching into state B raises the risk
premium. This eﬀect is weaker for a ﬁrm with a higher cash-capital ratio as the composition
eﬀect then becomes stronger.
When we decompose the total risk premium in state G into the technology and ﬁnancing
components we observe the following. First, Panel C plots the technology risk premium (the
ﬁrst term in (25)). As can be seen from this panel, when the external ﬁnancing conditions do
not change (ˆ ζG = 0) the technology risk premium is monotonically decreasing in w. However,
under time-varying external ﬁnancing costs, the risk with respect to higher future ﬁnancing
32costs generates market timing behavior and non-monotonicity in the marginal value of cash
(Figure 4, Panel B), which in turn may involve a technology risk premium that is locally
increasing in w for low levels of w. As the non-monotonicity in the marginal value of cash
is partially oﬀset by the asset composition eﬀect, the non-monotonicity in the technology
risk premium is relatively weak. Similarly, holding w ﬁxed at a low level, market timing can
lower p′
G(w) as the transition intensity ˆ ζG increases. This explains why the technology risk
premium may be decreasing in the transition intensity for low w.
Second, Panel D plots the ﬁnancing risk premium. The size of this premium depends on
the relative change in ﬁrm value when external ﬁnancing conditions change. It is increasing
in the transition intensity ˆ ζG, but decreasing in w. Intuitively, when cash holdings are low,
a sudden worsening in external ﬁnancing conditions is particularly costly, but when cash
holdings are high, the ﬁrm is able to avoid liquidation by cutting investment, engaging in
asset sales, and deferring payout, all of which mitigate impact of the ﬁnancing shock.
Our model has several implications for expected returns of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
Controlling for technology parameters and ﬁnancing costs, the model predicts an inverse re-
lation between returns and corporate cash holdings, which has been documented by Dittmar
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) among others. Our analysis points out that this negative rela-
tion may not be due to agency problems, as they emphasize, but may be driven by relaxed
ﬁnancing constraints and a changing asset composition of the ﬁrm.20
A related prediction is that ﬁrms that are more ﬁnancially constrained are not necessarily
more risky. The risk premium for a relatively more constrained ﬁrm can be lower than
that for a less constrained ﬁrm if the more constrained ﬁrm also holds more cash. This
observation may shed light on the recent studies by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006,
2009) documenting that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have low average returns. In
20When heterogeneity in technology and ﬁnancing costs is diﬃcult to measure, it is important to take into
account the endogeneity of cash holdings when comparing ﬁrms with diﬀerent cash holdings empirically. A
ﬁrm with higher external ﬁnancing costs will tend to hold more cash, however its risk premium may still
be higher than for a ﬁrm with lower ﬁnancing costs and consequently lower cash holdings. Thus, a positive
relation between returns and corporate cash holdings across ﬁrms may still be consistent with our model
(see Palazzo (2008) for a related model and supporting empirical evidence).
33our model, ﬁrms that face higher idiosyncratic risk will optimally hold more cash on average,
which could explain their lower risk premium.
Finally, with time-varying ﬁnancing conditions, our model can be seen as a conditional
two-factor model to explain the cross section of returns (we provide details of the derivation
in the Appendix). A ﬁrm’s risk premium is then determined by its technology beta and its
ﬁnancing beta. Other things equal, a ﬁrm whose ﬁnancing costs move closely with aggregate
ﬁnancing conditions will have a larger ﬁnancing beta and earn higher returns than one with
ﬁnancing costs independent of aggregate conditions. Empirically, this two-factor model can
be implemented using the standard market beta plus a beta with respect to a portfolio that
is sensitive to ﬁnancing shocks (e.g. a banking portfolio). This model, in particular, shows
how a ﬁrm’s conditional beta depends on the ﬁrm’s cash holdings.
7 Market Timing and Dynamic Hedging
We have thus far restricted the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing choices to only internal funds and external
equity ﬁnancing. In this section, we extend the model to allow the ﬁrm to engage in dynamic
hedging via derivatives such as market-index futures. How does market timing behavior
interact with dynamic hedging? And, how does the ﬁrm’s dynamic hedging strategy aﬀect
its market timing behavior? These are the questions we address in this section. We denote
by F the index futures price for a market portfolio that is already completely hedged against
ﬁnancing shocks. Under the risk-neutral probability measure, the future prices F then
evolves according to:
dFt = σmFtd ˆ Z
M
t , (27)
where σm is the volatility of the market index portfolio, and { ˆ ZM
t : t ≥ 0} is a standard
Brownian motion that is correlated with the ﬁrm’s productivity shock {ZA
t : t ≥ 0} with a
constant correlation coeﬃcient ρ.21
21Note that the futures price F follows a martingale after risk adjustment. The interesting case to consider
is when the index futures is imperfectly correlated with the ﬁrm’s productivity shock.
34We denote by ψt the fraction of the ﬁrm’s total cash Wt that it invests in the futures
contract. Futures contracts require that investors hold cash in a margin account. Thus, let
αt ∈ [0,1] denote the fraction of the ﬁrm’s total cash Wt held in the margin account. Cash
held in this margin account incurs a ﬂow unit cost ǫ ≥ 0. Futures market regulations typically
require that an investor’s futures position (in absolute value) cannot exceed a multiple π of
the amount of cash αtWt held in the margin account. We let this multiple be state dependent
and denote it by π(st). The margin requirement in state sthen imposes the following limit
on the ﬁrm’s futures position: |ψt| ≤ π(st)αt. As the ﬁrm can costlessly reallocate cash
between the margin account and its regular interest-bearing account, it optimally holds the
minimum amount of cash necessary in the margin account when ǫ > 0. Without much loss of
generality we shall ignore this haircut on the margin account and assume that ǫ = 0. Under
this assumption, we do not need to keep track of cash allocations in the margin account and
outside the account. We can then simply set αt = 1. Since the derivation of ﬁrm value and
optimal hedging policy follows closely the analysis in BCW we do not develop it in the text
below and provide a more detailed derivation in the Appendix C, where we establish that:


















−1/w, −πG}, for w ≥   wG ,
πG , for wG ≤ w ≤   wG .
We choose the correlation between index futures and the ﬁrm’s productivity shock to be
ρ = 0.6 and a market return volatility of σm = 20%. The margin requirements in states G
and B are set at πG = 5 and πB = 2, respectively. All other parameter values are the same
as in the previous sections.
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Figure 7: Optimal hedge ratios ψ
∗(w) in states G and B when state B is absorbing.
The parameter values are: market volatility σm = 20%, correlation coeﬃcient ρ = 0.6, margin
requirements πG = 5 and πB = 2. All other parameter values are given in Table 1.
Optimal hedge ratios ψ
∗





B(w). First, we note that for suﬃciently high w, the ﬁrm hedges in the same
way in both states. Hedging is then unconstrained by the ﬁrm’s cash holdings and costless,
so that the ﬁrm chooses its hedge ratio to be equal to −ρσσ−1
m /w so as to eliminate its
exposure to systematic volatility of the productivity shock. This explains the concave and
overlapping parts of the hedging policies in Figure 7.
Second, for low w hedging strategies diﬀer in the two states as follows: in state B the
hedge ratio hits the constraint ψ
∗
B(w) = −πB = −2 for w ≤ 0.3. In state G on the other
hand, ﬁrm value turns from concave to convex (due to market timing) when w is less than
˜ wG = 0.16 (where p′′(˜ wG) = 0). For w ∈ (wG, ˜ wG) ﬁrm value is convex in w so that the
ﬁrm does the opposite of hedging and engages in maximally allowed risk taking by setting
ψ
∗
G(w) = πG = 5 for w ∈ (0.06,0.16).








A. average q: qB(w)

















C. investment-capital ratio: iB(w)
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D. investment-cash sensitivity: i′
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Figure 8: Firm value and investment in the (absorbing) state B. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment in state B with and without hedging opportunities. External ﬁnancing
is available in state G, but not in B. For the hedging case, we set market volatility σm = 20%,
correlation coeﬃcient ρ = 0.6, and margin requirements: πG = 5 and πB = 2. All other parameter
values are given in Table 1.
Hedging and investment in the absorbing state B. Figure 8 plots ﬁrm value q(w) and
the investment-capital ratio i(w) as functions of w in the absorbing state B. We compare the
solutions with and without hedging. As in BCW, ﬁrm value q(w) is higher with hedging than
without (Panel A). Also, when w is suﬃciently high the net marginal value of cash q′
B(w) is
higher for ﬁrms that do not hedge than for those that do. This is because cash plays a more
important role in risk management when there are no other hedging tools available. However,
when cash is low, the marginal value of cash is higher when the ﬁrm hedges than when it
does not. This is due to the fact that the ﬁrm is more valuable with hedging opportunities
in the future than without. Hence, the marginal value of cash is greater for ﬁrms with better
37future prospects.
Similarly, investment-capital ratios on average are higher for ﬁrms that also hedge with
futures and for ﬁrms with suﬃciently high cash. However, when cash is low disinvestment
becomes a risk management tool: by reducing investment in productive capital the ﬁrm re-
plenishes cash and potentially lowers other costs of risk management. The end result is higher
ﬁrm value. Thus, although risk management in the long run helps mitigate underinvestment,
in the short run (when w is low) it may give rise to more underinvestment. These results
underscore the importance of analyzing an intertemporal model, as a dynamic analysis may
reveal surprising optimal behavior that would not be plausible in a static model.
Hedging, investment, and market timing in the transitory state G. Figure 9 plots
ﬁrm value, investment-capital ratio, and their sensitivities as functions of w in the transitory
state G. Again, we compare the solutions with and without hedging. Note ﬁrst that hedging
(or speculation) signiﬁcantly increases ﬁrm value (compare Panel A of Figure 8 with Panel
A in Figure 9). This value gain is much larger than in the absorbing state B. Second, the
marginal value of cash is lower for ﬁrms that hedge as long as the ﬁrm is not too constrained
(i.e., has enough cash). For cash strapped ﬁrms the marginal value of cash is higher for
ﬁrms with hedging opportunities (See Panel B of Figure 9). Third, ﬁrms issue equity later
(engage in less market timing) when they hedge than when they do not (i.e., w is lower with
hedging). Similarly, ﬁrm that hedge hoard less cash and pay out to shareholders earlier.
Comparing investment policies for ﬁrms that hedge to those of ﬁrms that do not hedge
we note, ﬁrst, that investment is on average higher with hedging than without hedging.
This follows directly from the observation that hedging increases ﬁrm value by mitigating
its underinvestment problem (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993)). Second, note again that
while hedging mitigates underinvestment for most values of w, it does not for suﬃciently
low w. The logic is the same as in the absorbing state: when w is low underinvestment is a
more eﬃcient way to manage risk.
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Figure 9: Firm value and investment in the (transitory) state G. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment in state G with and without hedging opportunities. External ﬁnancing is
available in state G, but not in state B. For the hedging case, we set market volatility σm = 20%,
correlation coeﬃcient ρ = 0.6, and margin requirements: πG = 5 and πB = 2. All other parameter
values are given in Table 1.
8 A Recurrent Two-State Model
For expositional clarity, we have so far considered only somewhat stylized scenarios where
either the “low-cost” or the “high-cost” ﬁnancing state are absorbing. In reality, ﬁrms face
mean-reverting ﬁnancing opportunities and the reader may wonder whether our main results
carry over to this more general setting. We next show that our main results on market timing,
investment, and risk management continue to hold with recurrent changes in the ﬁnancing
conditions. Moreover, they carry over even when we allow ﬁrms to tap external equity
markets in state B albeit at a high cost. We now assume that the ﬁxed cost of ﬁnancing is



































C. investment-capital ratio: is(w)














D. investment-cash sensitivity: i′
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Figure 10: Firm value and investment in the recurrent model. This ﬁgure plots the
average q and investment when the two states are recurrent. All the parameter values are given in
Table 1.
φB = 30%, a level at which the ﬁrm still prefers ﬁnancing to liquidation in state B.
Figure 10 plots ﬁrm value (average q) and investment is(w) for both states, and their
sensitivities with respect to w. The top left panel shows that average q in state G is higher
than the average q in state B: the ﬁrm has higher valuation in the state with low ﬁnancing
cost than the state where external ﬁnancing is more costly. Note that the valuation (average
q) diﬀerence in this example is purely due to the diﬀerence in ﬁnancing costs between the two
states. Therefore, using average q to control for investment opportunities and then testing
for the presence of ﬁnancing constraints by using variables such as cash ﬂows or cash (which
is often done in the empirical literature) would be misleading in our setup. Second, as shown
in Panel C, investment in state G is higher than in state B for a given w, but the diﬀerence
40is especially large when w is low. Also, investment on average is much less variable with
respect to w when external ﬁnancing costs are lower.
Third, the convexity of ﬁrm value and the non-monotonicity of investment in state G for
low values of w continues to hold. This is illustrated in the upper left and right panels. The
intuition is essentially the same as that in the earlier sections. Financing is cheap in state G
only for a ﬁnite stochastic duration, which makes the ﬁnancing timing option valuable. The
optimal equity issuance boundary in state G is strictly positive: w = 0.055. These ﬁndings
imply that our earlier results about speculation continue to hold in the recurrent setting.
Finally, as in the previous analysis, we ﬁnd that in state B there is no market timing: the
ﬁrm does not issue equity before it exhausts its cash holdings. Also, ﬁrm value is concave in
w in state B and investment responds positively in w, as the external ﬁnancing option is out
of the money in state B. In sum, ﬁrm behavior in states B and G are drastically diﬀerent
even in the recurrent model. Financing constraints and stochastic ﬁnancing opportunities
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence ﬁrm value (average q) and investment.
9 Conclusion
We provide a simple integrated framework of dynamic market timing, corporate investment,
and risk management. Financing conditions and supply of external capital change stochas-
tically over time. Firms anticipate the stochastic evolution of these ﬁnancing opportunities
and respond optimally. In particular, they optimally build war-chests by issuing equity and
hoarding cash, when external ﬁnancing is suﬃciently cheap. For ﬁrms anticipating an eq-
uity issuance, investment may be decreasing in the ﬁrm’s cash-to-asset ratio: when ﬁrms
get closer to equity issuance their investment policy is less constrained by the availability of
internal funds, as the ﬁrm anticipates that more cash will be raised through an equity issue
in the near future. We also show that market timing is consistent with risk-seeking behavior
by the ﬁrm. The key driving mechanism for these surprising dynamic implications is the
ﬁnite duration of “cheap” ﬁnancing conditions and the ﬁxed cost of equity issuance.
41While we provide the ﬁrst dynamic framework to jointly study market timing, corporate
investment, and risk management, our model is one with exogenous shifts of ﬁnancing op-
portunities. It would clearly be desirable to consider a general equilibrium setting where the
stochastic ﬁnancing opportunities arise endogenously. We leave this for future research.
42Table 1: Summary of Key Variables and Parameters
This table summarizes the symbols for the key variables used in the model and the parameter values in the benchmark
case. For each upper-case variable in the left column (except K, A, and F), we use its lower case to denote the ratio
of this variable to capital. Whenever a variable or parameter depends on the state s, we denote the dependence with a
subscript s. All the boundary variables are in terms of the cash-capital ratio wt.
Variable Symbol Parameters Symbol state G state B
A. Baseline model
Capital stock K Riskfree rate r 4.34%
Cash holding W Rate of depreciation δ 15%
Investment I Risk-neutral mean productivity shock µ 21.2%
Cumulative productivity shock A Volatility of productivity shock σ 20%
Investment adjustment cost G Adjustment cost parameter θ 6.902
Cumulative operating proﬁt Y Center of adjustment cost parameter ν 12%
Cumulative external ﬁnancing H Proportional cash-carrying cost λ 1.5%
Cumulative external ﬁnancing cost X Proportional ﬁnancing cost γ 6%
Cumulative payout U Correlation between ZA
t and ZM
t ρ 0.6
Firm value P Price of risk for technology shocks η 0.4
Average q q
Net marginal value of cash q′ State transition intensity ζs 0.1 0.9
Payout boundary w Capital liquidation value ls 1.1 0.7
Financing boundary w Fixed ﬁnancing cost φs 1.0% 20%
Return cash-capital ratio m Price of risk for ﬁnancing shocks κs ln(3) −ln(3)
Conditional risk premium µR
B. Hedging
Hedge ratio ψ Market volatility σm 20%
Fraction of cash in margin account α
Futures price F Margin requirement πs 5 2
Maximum-hedging boundary ˆ w
Speculation boundary ˜ w
4
3Appendix
A A more general formulation of the model
Our text analysis focuses on variations of the two-state model. However, it is straightforward
to generalize our model to a setting with multiple states, denoted by st = 1,    ,n. Let the
transition rate matrix for the n-state Markov chain be ζ = [ζij]. The n-state Markov
chain can capture both aggregate and ﬁrm-speciﬁc, both productivity and ﬁnancing shocks
(examples are business cycle or ﬁnancial crises shocks). The ﬁrm’s expected return on capital,
volatility, and ﬁnancing costs can all change when the state changes.
A.1 Risk adjustments
To properly adjust for systematic risk in the model, we assume that the economy is charac-
terized by a stochastic discount factor (SDF) Λt, which evolves as
dΛt
Λt−












where r(s) is the risk-free rate in state s, η(s) is the risk price for systematic Brownian shocks
ZM
t , κ(i,j) is the relative jump size of the discount factor when the Markov chain switches
from state i to state j, and M
(i,j)





t − ζijdt, i  = j, (29)
where we have utilized the result that an n-state continuous-time Markov chain with gen-
erator [ζij] can be equivalently expressed as a sum of independent Poisson processes N
(i,j)
t
(i  = j) with intensity parameters ζij (see e.g., Chen (2010)).22 The above SDF captures two
22More speciﬁcally, the process s solves the following stochastic diﬀerential equation, dst =
 
k =st− δk (st−)dN
(st−,k)
t , where δk (j) = j − i.
44diﬀerent types of risk in the markets: small systematic shocks generated by the Brownian
motion, and large systematic shocks from the Markov chain. We assume that dZM
t is par-
tially correlated with the ﬁrm’s productivity shock dZA
t , with instantaneous correlation ρdt.
Chen (2010) shows that the SDF in (28) can be generated from a consumption-based asset
pricing model.
The SDF deﬁnes a risk neutral probability measure Q, under which the process for the
ﬁrm’s productivity shocks becomes (6). In addition, if a change of state in the Markov chain
corresponds to a jump in the SDF, then the corresponding large shock also carries a risk
premium, which leads to an adjustment of the transition intensity under Q:
ˆ ζij = e
κ(i,j)ζij , i  = j. (30)
A.2 Solutions for the n-state model



































for each state s = 1,    ,n and the average q in state s is given by with
q
FB







While there are no closed form solutions for n > 2, it is straightforward to solve the system
of nonlinear equations numerically.
With ﬁnancial frictions, the HJB equation is generalized from (11) as follows:
rsP(K,W,s) = max
I













45for each state s = 1,    ,n, and Ws ≤ W ≤ W s. We conjecture that ﬁrm value is
homogeneous of degree one in W and K in each state, so that
P(K,W,s) = ps(w)K, (34)
where ps(w) solves the following system of ODE:
rsps(w) = max
is














ˆ ζss′ (ps′ (w) − ps (w)). (35)
The boundary conditions in each state s are deﬁned in similar ways as in Equation (14-21).
B Beta Representation
As indicated by the SDF Λt in (28) with n = 2, in state s, the price of risk for technology
shock (risk premium for a unit exposure to the shocks) is λ
T
s = ηs, whereas the price of risk
for ﬁnancing shock is λ
F























s (w) = ζs
ps− (w) − ps (w)
ps (w)
(38)
are the technology Beta and ﬁnancing Beta respectively for the ﬁrm in state s. The tech-
nology Beta will be large when the marginal value of cash relative to ﬁrm value is high; the
ﬁnancing Beta will be large when the probability that the ﬁnancing condition will change is
46high, or when the change in ﬁnancing condition has large impact on the ﬁrm value.
Since there are two sources of aggregate shocks in this model, the CAPM does not hold.
Instead, expected returns can be explained by a two-factor model. We assume that there
are two diversiﬁed portfolios T and F, each only subject to one type of aggregate shocks,




t = (rs +  
T



































κs − 1). (42)
We can now rewrite the risk premium in (39) and (40) using Betas as follows:
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are the technology Beta (Beta with respect to Portfolio T) and ﬁnancing Beta (Beta with
respect to Portfolio F) for the ﬁrm in state s. The technology Beta will be large when the
marginal value of cash relative to ﬁrm value is high; the ﬁnancing Beta will be large when the
probability that the ﬁnancing condition will change is high, or when the change in ﬁnancing
condition has large impact on the ﬁrm value.
47C Dynamic Hedging
We now derive the optimal hedging policy in detail for Section 7. The ﬁrm’s cash holding
thus evolves as follows:
dWt = Kt [µ(st)dAt + σ(st)dZt]−(It + Γt)dt+dHt−dUt+[r(st)) − λ(st)]Wtdt+ψtWtσmdBt , (46)
where |ψt| ≤ π(st). To avoid unnecessary repetition, we only consider the case with positive
correlation, i.e., ρ > 0. We consider the more interesting case where the absorbing state is
the crisis state and the ﬁrm is currently in the transitory state G. We ﬁrst summarize the
risk management rules in the absorbing state, eﬀectively the results from BCW. Then, we
analyze the hedge ratio in the transitory state G.
In the absorbing state B. After reaching the absorbing state, the ﬁrm faces the same
decision problem as the ﬁrm in BCW does. For simplicity, in the crisis state, as in the
previous section, the ﬁrm has no external ﬁnancing but can enter index futures contract.










Intuitively, the ﬁrm chooses the hedge ratio ψ so that the ﬁrm only faces idiosyncratic volatil-
ity after hedging. The hedge ratio that achieves this objective is −ρσBσ−1
m /w. However, this
hedge ratio may not be attainable due to the margin requirement. In that case, the ﬁrm
chooses the maximally admissible hedge ratio ψ
∗
B(w) = −πB. Equation (47) captures the
eﬀect of margin constraints on hedging. Because there is no hair cut (i.e., ǫ = 0), the hedge
ratio ψ given in (47) is independent of ﬁrm value and only depends on w. We next turn to
the focus of this section: hedging in the transitory state G.
In the transitory state G. Before entering the crisis state, the ﬁrm has external ﬁnancing
opportunity. Moreover, the margin requirement may be diﬀerent (i.e., πG > πB). In the
48transitory state G, the ﬁrm chooses its investment policy I and its index futures position
ψW to maximize ﬁrm value P(K,W,G) by solving the following HJB equation:
rGP(K,W,G) = max
I,ψ









PWW + ζ [P(K,W,G) − P(K,W,B)] ,
subject to |ψ| ≤ πG.
When ﬁrm value is concave in cash (i.e., PWW(K,W,G) < 0), we have the same solution




market timing opportunities combined with ﬁxed costs of equity issuance imply that ﬁrm
value may be convex in cash, i.e., PWW(K,W,G) > 0 for certain regions of w = W/K.
With convexity, the ﬁrm naturally speculates in derivatives markets. Given the margin
requirement, the ﬁrm takes the maximally allowed futures position, i.e. the corner solution
ψG(w) = πG. Note that the ﬁrm is long in futures despite positive correlation between its
productivity shock and the index futures. Let   wG denote the endogenously chosen point at
which PWW(K,W,G) = 0, or p′′
G(  wG) = 0. We now summarize the ﬁrm’s futures position in








−1/w, −πG}, for w ≥   wG ,
πG , for wG ≤ w ≤   wG .
(49)
Note the discontinuity of the hedge ratio ψ
∗
G(w) in w. The ﬁrm switches from a hedger to a
speculator when its cash-capital ratio w falls below   wG.
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